Saturday, March 31, 2012

Auto de procesamiento de Mudhar Hussein Almalki / Indictment against AQ member arrested in Spain

Interesting arrest in Spain (Abu Susu's blog)

Copio de Abu Susu's blog, Interesting arrest in Spain :

According to this report by Fox News Spanish police arrested a man who allegedly worked 8 – 15 hours online every day on behalf of AQ-C, AQAP and AQIM, busying himself with what was described as recruiting and transportation issues. He is also said to have administered one of the world's most important jihadist forums.

Now this clearly sounds interesting, and I fully share @azelin's speculation that this sounds as if the man (apparently a Jordanian-born Saudi) may have been involved in the al-Fajr project.

Al-Fajr kept me quite busy for a while back in 2008 when I published an article about them after I had learned what Western intelligence services believed to have found out at the time - namely that al-Fajr, which appeared then and still appears mainly as a distribution network for propaganda from the outside, was in reality also a secret communications channel linking AQ central leadership with the leadership of the branches and top tier website administrators. This way crude and uncut versions of terror videos were said to be moved.

Another example according to my sources at the time was that AQ central used the communication system for reminding Iraqi cadres of handing over due money in one case. It was also believed that only around two dozens people had the necessary log in information for that „forum inside the forums“ or for what one agent dubbed „al-Qaida's intranet“.

It is of course not easy to judge whether al-Fajr still has that role today. But if it turned out to be true that the man arrested in Spain was in fact an al-Fajr operative, it would be a very interesting case indeed – and one where I would dearly like to follow court proceedings should he ever be prosecuted.

Friday, March 30, 2012

Francia : 19 detenidos / France arrests 19 suspected Islamists

Mohammed Achamlane, portavoz de Forsane Alizza, es uno de los detenidos. Foto : AFP/Fred Dufour

Siria / Syria


Annan's Deal Is al-Assad's Last Chance -- Ed Husain, Council On Foreign Relations

Ousting Syria’s Assad through a ‘soft landing’ -- David Ignatius, Washington Post

Libia : 70 muertos en tres días / 70 killed in three days in Libya

La huelga, vista desde fuera

Spain engulfed by nationwide anti-austerity strike -- AP

Angry Spaniards strike against labor reform -- Reuters

Millions stay off the job to protest new labor laws in Spain -- L.A. Times

Spanish workers strike against labor reforms -- MSNBC

Spain Vows to Resist Strikers’ Demands to Reverse Labor Law -- Bloomberg Businessweek

Spain Hit By General Strike -- Wall Street Journal

Spanish Workers Protest Labor Reforms -- Voice of America


Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Marruecos : el rey, los negocios, los cortesanos

Cumbre en Rabat

El comité de dirección la iniciativa "5 +5 Defensa" se reunió en Rabat los pasados días veintiséis y veintisiete de marzo.

Fundada en 2004, la iniciativa "5 +5" comprende la celebración de reuniones periódicas y de ejercicios militares combinados de las fuerzas armadas de Marruecos, Argelia, Túnez, Libia, Mauritania, España, Francia, Italia, Portugal y Malta.

Los proyectos conjuntos incluyen la vigilancia marítima, la seguridad de la aviación, la prevención de desastres, la formación y la investigación, centrándose en la lucha contra el terrorismo, el crimen organizado y el tráfico ilegal de personas.

Más en :

Rabat hosts '5+5 Defence' meeting -- Magharebia

Mohamed Merá tenía conexiones con la DCRI, según el ex jefe de la DST

Mohammed Merá. Foto : Reuters / France 2 television

Monday, March 26, 2012

Combating maritime piracy -- Council on foreign relations

 Combating maritime piracy -- Council on foreign relations

Diccionarios y gramáticas de árabe

En es posible encontrar gramáticas y diccionarios.

At CIA, a convert to Islam leads the terrorism hunt

Forsane alizza, "caballeros de la gloria", jugando al "paint ball" (video)

El muerto firmó su último "tweet" Mohamed Merah-Forsane Alizza.

Y aquí tenemos a los forsane alizza, a los "caballeros de la gloria", jugando al "paintball" :

Gentileza de Don Carlos.

En palabras de mi Amigo, ocultar sus intenciones no es uno de sus defectos...

Sunday, March 25, 2012

Mohamed Merá no era un "lobo solitario"

Copio de Doña Jytte Klausen, The Wall Street Journal, France's Jihadist Shooter Was No Lone Wolf :

Mohamed Merah, the Frenchman who assassinated three French paratroopers of North African background and then launched a terrible attack on a Jewish school --murdering a teacher, his two young sons and an 8-year-old girl-- claimed to act for al Qaeda.

Skeptics have dismissed the claim, saying al Qaeda barely functions anymore.

But Merah was no "lone wolf" and did indeed bear the imprint of al Qaeda.

Young and alienated, Merah had served two years in a juvenile prison for robbery. Was he rejected by French society because of his Algerian background? "He snapped," say friends. After prison, he was completely cut off from reality, said his lawyer.

In fact, Merah was practically a prince in French jihadist circles.

His mother is married to the father of Sabri Essid, a leading member of the Toulouse radical milieu who was captured in Syria in 2006.

Essid and another Frenchman were running an al Qaeda safe house in Syria for fighters going to Iraq.

In a 2009 trial that came to be known in the press as "Brothers for Iraq," they and six others were convicted in France of conspiracy for terrorist purposes.

Essid was sentenced in 2009 to five years imprisonment.

Family contacts could have been instrumental in setting up Merah's jihadist contacts and facilitating his travels to South Asia.

Le Monde reports that the Pakistani Taliban and the Uzbek Islamic Movement trained Merah to become a killer.

In 2010, he was captured in Afghanistan (reportedly by Afghan forces) and handed over to the French government, yet French media report that he was able to return to Northwest Pakistan in 2011.

The French police have confirmed that Merah was under periodic surveillance in recent months.

That he slipped through and was able to carry out his attacks will become a source of criticism and self-recrimination on the part of the generally efficient French police. It certainly suggests that he had help from a network.

In executing his attacks, Merah did everything by the jihadist textbook.

He made sure he would die a martyr's death that would be witnessed on television screens around the world. 

He murdered with a video camera strapped to his body, making him star and director of his own epic.

He told journalists his videos would soon be uploaded.

In the attack at the Jewish school Monday morning, Merah held a little girl by her hair while he paused to reload his gun.

He then shot her.

In a recording found in his apartment he tells another victim, a soldier: "You kill my brothers, I kill you".

This is theater.

The Internet was his friend. "I have changed my life . . . on video," said one of his last tweets (in French) during the siege.

His account ID featured a black knight on a horse holding high the flag of jihad.

He signed that last tweet "Mohamed Merah-Forsane Alizza".

Forsane Alizza, or "Knights of Glory," is a France-based jihadist media organization that was banned in January by French authorities after they discovered members preparing to train in armed combat.

The ban made little difference, as content was uploaded to new sites.

A website using the Forsane Alizza alias is still active --and registered with a domain name registrar and Web hosting company based in the state of Washington.

Two hours before the police arrived at his apartment, Merah was calling a French TV station.

He appears to have had the media on speed-dial and was an active user not only of Twitter but of Facebook and YouTube. (Authorities took down his online outlets one-by-one on Wednesday).

Merah's shootings in Toulouse again shatter the illusion that counterterrorism can be 100% successful. 

Jihadist terrorism exploits our freedoms and opportunities in a global campaign linking foreign insurgencies and extremist activism in the West.

Highly scripted and planned with the assistance of accomplices in and outside of France, Merah did not act in isolation.

Ms. Klausen. a professor of politics at Brandeis University and author of "The Cartoons That Shook the World" (Yale University Press, 2009), is founder of the Western Jihadism Project, which tracks and analyzes the development of jihadi networks in the West.

Y siguen faltando 150 kilos de explosivo (Grenoble : 150 kg d'explosifs volés).

On Algeria/Mauritania/AQIM/MUJWA

Copio de The Moor next door, Back from a minor hiatus :

Your blogger has been absent from this space for some time. This is unintentional; other projects have taken up much time. This post tries to touch on something the things this blogger has been considering in the interval since the last regular post went up — on Algeria, Mauritania and MUJWA in very general terms. It is incomplete, more posts will continue on a more or less regular basis from now on.

Since the last post, which drew many comments because it was incomplete and was written more or less on a time crunch. The comments left by readers are worth reviewing as they clear up confusion on some important points on what were then recent events in Mauritania. That post was trying to get at something that still stands: Mauritania is facing many structural political problems at several levels and these almost certainly take first place when compared to issues like the terrorism file (which is important on its own and in its own way and more so when added on to these other troubles). The last two months saw impressive and in some cases unprecedented manifestations of popular protest; this week Nouakchott saw what was perhaps the largest single demonstration in its history, numbering, depending on what source one looks at, 40,000 people (and possibly more) a number which speaks for itself in a country of roughly 4m people, close to a quarter of whom live in or near the capital city. The discontent mentioned in the last post and several others before has grown over the last several months, owing to  the standard inequalities and injustices suffered by Mauritanians and others in north-west Africa, not to mention the relatively dire food security situation, the upsetting of grazing patterns in the eastern part of the country brought on by the conflict in Mali, the not so special style of corruption preferred by the current president and leadership which is more narrow that in the past and less satisfying to key parts of the tribal and business and social fabric. This blogger has more thoughts on the last part of this and has written about it before (and will put more on the blog soon); in the meantime there are multiple fine resources for some of the recent events in the way of protests. The youth movement, which looked as if it were going to petter out a few months ago has increased its online presence and has put up much in the way of images and videos on Facebook, Twitter and the rest of the social media board. The trouble likely to come from the election fiasco will be a key flash point soon enough (probably more so than in Algeria, for some comparison). It used to be said that nothing ever happened in Mauritania (aside from coups), that it was a “quiet” country. This idea is less and less appealing. Great coverage of recent events, including Nasser Weddady’s recent posts herehere and especially here where he has posted the opposition coalition’s 43 page manifesto demanding a national unity government (in Arabic), on the grounds that the government has been essentially extra-constitutional since the government pushed back last year’s elections (this situation sort typifies the kinds of challenges facing Mauritania this blogger has tried to emphasise in the last several months) and Lissa Hunt’s recent tweets and posts. Right now is a critical time for Mauritania.

Your blogger no longer agrees with himself in whole when it comes to the Algerian elections. He wrote a piece for Fair Observer at the end of December (which was published at the beginning of January) regarding the prospects for Islamist parties in the May elections there. The view was the elections do not particularly matter; at that point it was difficult to say what “might” happen other than that one can say it is likely few Algerians will vote with relative confidence. It is now clear the consensus in the regime is that some iteration of Islamists, be it the MSP-led coalition of Islamist parties taking seats from parts of the FLN and RND or some of the small secular parties or the several recently formed Islamist parties getting seats on their own and thus making up a divided but more numerous stake out for the religious trend generally. Whatever the case the lower house less important than much foreign press coverage and commentary has made it out to be — do not forget the upper house, the Majlis al-Ummah, a third of which is appointed by the president and which has veto power over the lower house. What will come out of the constitutional reforms that are being ginned up for this year may change this, though it is doubtful. And if “Islamists” perform in line with the trend seen elsewhere in the Maghreb the outcome will probably look more like Morocco, with palace Islamists (the MSP, which as this blog and many, many Algerians have noted, has been in government for close to a decade and its members still serve in the cabinet in important and lucrative posts such as public works; meaning there are probably thick files on them held by the security services which may help regulate them if they attempt to get out of line as has happened in the past), than Egypt or some such. There are plenty of other trends more interesting than the elections to watch in Algeria and to take as indicators of the mood in the country; some of these overlap with the elections (or will do so) and some of them stand on their own. The succession issue at the top of the regime and in the deep state probably matter more than how the lower house get rearranged. There was the notable resignation of Sa’id Sa’di from his post as the chief of the Rally for Culture and Democracy which has earned a bum rap from many for various reasons — its more or less supporting for the military, its aggressive secularism, its ideological direction, whatever one wants. This blogger wrote about its (ex-)leader’s links with the head of the security services last spring and its participation in the February protests. That well known relationship is yet another dingy point on Sa’di’s reputation with many Algerians who pay attention to him. Rumours after his resignation, though, suggest he probably suffered some pressure from the regime as a result of his activities and rhetoric in 2011; realignments and subtle shifts look likely for small factions and cosmetic elements supportive of or tolerated by the regime.

The Movement for Unity and Jihad (MUJWA) has been described in various ways: a “splinter” from AQIM, a reorganisation of the group’s southern front, a victory for Algerian or some other intelligence service in infiltrating and splitting up AQIM, and other things. There is not enough information available on the group or its membership to assess the validity of such claims. One has to start up with certain assumptions in order for most of these theories to work out. Some of these have more support based on what is known of MUJWA’s leaders and recent AQIM activities – or rumours and reports of AQIM’s activities – other have less support. As yet not many of them are particularly convincing based on the available information about the group.

The narrative in the group’s initial (and thus far only) propaganda video does not jive easily with the theory that the group is a “reorganisation” of AQIM’s operational structure and that the group is not really a splinter faction — it announces a break with AQIM, and essentially rephrases and reframes AQIM’s narrative against western powers and jihad for its own purposes. The group’s first operation, the kidnapping of European aid workers in October 2011, and its first announcement in December suggest it may have formed in the early autumn or that the group’s members went rogue from AQIM after the October operation. Relatively little is known about the key individuals associated with the organisation: Virtually all of them, from the group’s reputed leader, Hamada Ould Mohamed Khayrou to Sultan Ould Badi appear to be Arab Mauritanians or Malians from the Azawad (from north of Gao especially). And their attacks thus far, the October 2011 kidnapping of European aid workers and the recent suicide bombing at Tamanrasset, suggest a north-ward orientation, not surprisingly done in a fashion similar to AQIM itself. At present the group’s objectives and trajectory appear contradictory and even confusing. This blogger is not prepared to make conclusions as his friend Andrew Lebovich has in terms of the group’s true motives or nature based on such little information at this stage, though his analysis has important points, for example on possible coordination/communication between MUJWA and AQIM make some sense and are compelling. His point on both groups demanding the release of Major Abderrahmane Ould Meidou is also worth considering; and as he reocognises in the update to his original post on the issue, social and personal relations between the group are somewhat inevitable given MUJWA’s genealogy. This is one of the more important elements — Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (also Khayrou/Khayri/Kheiry) is an individual whose background and relations with AQIM’s leadership is worth considering and comparing with other Mauritanian leaders of late such as Khaled Chinguitti, who was promoted at some point in 2011 and had taken on important operational leadership roles and was reportedly killed some months ago fighting with MNLA men in Mali, though his death was reported by only one source (ANI; though readers may be aware of other reports that do not rely on the ANI account, if they exist). As more information stacks up a more or less clear picture may materialise. Or it may not. At this point this blogger does not agree or disagree with any particular analysis of the matter per se.

The group presents interesting questions: What tensions exist in the relationships within and between AQIM’s southern katibat and suryiat in terms of their ethno-national composition? Much attention goes to supposed tensions between two of AQIM’s southern commanders, Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid; what about tensions at lower echelons? What personal factors would contribute to driving a group of Mauritanian and Azawadi Malians out of AQIM into a new group oriented southward (at least in its rhetoric)? (This could speak to their area of operation and potentially their relationships with other groups operating in the area.) What kind of longevity will this group have in a competitive environment where it must compete with groups such as the MNLA and Ansar ed-Din in addition to AQIM? What will AQIM’s ultimate response to MUJWA be? At present there are more questions than answers.

Somalia pirates: EU approves attacks on land bases

Somalia pirates: EU approves attacks on land bases -- BBC

Inland Somali pirate bases to be targeted -- The Telegraph

EU extends range of its anti-piracy patrols, allowing strikes inside Somalia -- Washington Post/AP

EU authorises warships to hit Somali pirate lairs -- AFP

EU Navy cleared to attack pirates on land -- Global Post

EU ships to hit Somali pirates' land bases -- Defence Management

EU extends Somalia counter-piracy operation by two years -- Reuters

EU Extends Counter-piracy Operations Off Somalia By Two More Years -- RTT News

EU to back strikes on Somali pirates -- News24

Rohan Gunaratna : Al-Qaeda grows in Africa

Foto : The National Interest
Rohan Gunaratna : Al-Qaeda grows in Africa

Friday, March 23, 2012

Vacuna contra el "etnocentrismo" : the significance of culture to the Military

Assessing al-qa`ida’s presence in the New Libya

Assessing al-qa`ida’s presence in the new Libya -- Aaron Y. Zelin, Andrew Lebovich

Guerras por el agua

Foreign Policy : ¿Vuelven los golpes de Estado?

Coups making a comeback? -- Foreign Policy

Francia y el golpe de Estado en Malí

Fernando Reinares : The evidence of al-qa`ida’s role in the 2004 Madrid attack

Foto : Christophe Simon/AFP/Getty Images

Alistair BONNETT, The idea of the West (2004)

Alistair BONNETT, The idea of the West (2004) -- Scribd

Wednesday, March 21, 2012

Mali's Tuareg rebellion : what next?

Foto : al jazeera

Soeren Kern, GEES : "Jihadists "Liberating" Spain for Islam"

Copio de Soeren Kern, Stonegate Institue: Jihadists "Liberating" Spain for Islam :

Nine Islamists accused of planning terrorist attacks aimed at "liberating" Spain for Islam are standing trial in Madrid.

Spanish public prosecutors say the men -- Salafi-Jihadists who belonged to an Islamist cell known as the "Army of the Messiah" (Ansar al-Mahdi) -- sought to "free" the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in northern Africa, from Spanish rule and thus begin the Islamic re-conquest of Spain.

Salafism is a branch of radical Islam that seeks forcibly to re-establish an Islamic empire (Caliphate) across the Middle East, North Africa and Spain, which Salafists view as a Muslim state that must be reconquered for Islam.

Much of Spain was ruled by Muslim conquerors from 711 and 1492; Salafists believe that the territories the Muslims lost during the Spanish Reconquista still belong to them and that they have a right to return and establish their rule there. This belief is based on the Islamic precept that territories once occupied by Muslims must forever remain under Muslim domination as part of the Waqf [detained or preserved] -- a religious endowment now implicitly owned forever by Allah.

Spanish prosecutors say the jihadist cell operated out of the Darkawia mosque in the El Príncipe Alfonso neighborhood of Ceuta. The ringleader of the group is a Moroccan imam named Mohammed Abdessalam, who prosecutors say "preached the most extreme version of Islam."

The jihadists are accused of plotting a series of bombings in Ceuta, including churches, the city's main port and other parts of the city's infrastructure, in an effort to "duplicate the train bombings that occurred in Madrid on March 11, 2004." The Madrid bombings, which killed 191 people and wounded 1,800, are considered to be one of the worst terrorist attacks in modern European history.

Prosecutors are seeking prison sentences of eight years for each of the suspects, whose trial is taking place at the Spanish High Court (Audiencia Nacional) in Madrid.

The trial comes as a leaked secret report prepared by Spain's National Intelligence Center (CNI) in January warns that Salafi Islamists pose the greatest threat to security in Spain.

The document warns of "alarming symptoms" of the presence in Spain of members and cells of an Islamist group, Takfir wal-Hijra, which subscribes to the "most radical and violent version of Salafi-Jihadism".

Takfir wal-Hijra doctrine promotes "jihad without rules" by accepting non-Muslim practices such as drinking alcohol and drug trafficking as a cover for extremist activities. The group aspires to subjugate the entire planet under a "global caliphate ruled exclusively by Islamic Sharia law," according to CNI. Members of the group are now firmly established in Barcelona, Madrid, Málaga and Valencia, among other Spanish cities.

The CNI document states that police have detected Takfir activities in four mosques in Barcelona and two mosques in Valencia. The mosques are "led by radical imams from Algeria and Morocco" and are centers for "proselytization and recruitment of new members using religious instruction as a decoy".

The CNI report echoes earlier warnings by American and Spanish officials who contend that the autonomous region of Catalonia in northeastern Spain is "a major Mediterranean center for radical Islamists," according to diplomatic cables that were obtained by Wikileaks and published by the Madrid-based El País newspaper in December 2010.

The three cables, all of which are from the US Embassy in Madrid, say that Catalonia has become "a prime base of operations" for Islamic terrorists; and thanks to uncontrolled immigration the region, it now has a "large Muslim population susceptible to jihadist recruitment".

The documents also provide insights into the extent of the links between Islamic terrorists and organized crime in Barcelona, which the cables call a "crossroads of worrisome activities." The problem is so grave that the United States has proposed setting up an intelligence hub at the U.S. Consulate in Barcelona to counter the growing threat.

A five-page cable, dated October 2, 2007, for example, describes the link between mass immigration to Spain during the past decade and the rise of radical Islamism in the country.

The document, which is classified secret and apparently authored by then-Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre, states: "Heavy immigration -- both legal and illegal -- from North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) and Southeast Asia (Pakistan and Bangladesh) has made Catalonia a magnet for terrorist recruiters. … The Spanish National Police estimates that there may be upwards of 60,000 Pakistanis living in Barcelona and the surrounding area; the vast majority are male, unmarried or unaccompanied, and without legal documentation. There are even more such immigrants from North Africa. … They live on the edges of Spanish society, they do not speak the language, they are often unemployed, and they have very few places to practice their religion with dignity. … Individually, these circumstances would provide fertile ground for terrorist recruitment; taken together, the threat is clear."

The cable also describes the "amorphous threat represented by the nexus of terrorism, crime and drug trafficking" in Catalonia, which the document says has become an international magnet for drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal smuggling, prostitution, organized crime and counterfeiting.
"There is little doubt that the autonomous region of Catalonia has become a prime base of operations for terrorist activity. Spanish authorities tell us they fear the threat from these atomized immigrant communities prone to radicalism, but they have very little intelligence on or ability to penetrate these groups," the cable states.

The sad irony is that many of Spain's problems with Salafi-Jihadism are self-inflicted. Catalonia, for example, has a very active separatist movement that seeks the independence of Catalonia from Spain. Catalan separatism is based on the idea that Catalonia is a separate nation with its own unique history, culture and language.

In an effort to promote the Catalan language, Catalonian pro-independence parties for decades have promoted immigration from non-Spanish-speaking countries, especially from Arabic-speaking Muslim countries, in the rather short-sighted belief that these immigrants would learn the Catalan language rather than speak Spanish.

The end result of this disastrous immigration policy is that Catalonia is now the "New Mecca of the Most Radical Islamism," according to the Catalan nationalist party Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC), which is having second thoughts about the wisdom of promoting Muslim immigration as a strategy to achieve Catalan independence.

In any event, Salafi preachers -- who do not believe in democracy and teach that Islamic Sharia law is above Spanish civil law -- are now calling on Muslims who are eligible to vote in Spain to support Catalan separatist parties as a means firmly to establish Islamism in Catalonia.

Abdelwahab Houzi, for example, is a Salafi jihadist preacher in the Catalan city of Lérida, where 29,000 Muslims now make up around 20% of the city's total population.

Houzi, who adheres to the radical Wahhabi sect of Islam, recently said: "Muslims should vote for pro-independence parties, as they need our votes. But what they do not know is that, when they allow us to vote, we will all vote for Islamic parties because we do not believe in left and right. This will make us win local councils and as we begin to accumulate power in the Catalan autonomous region, Islam will begin to be implemented".
Soeren Kern is Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Siria / Syria

Syria: Overview -- Yahoo News
Syria Live Blog -- Al Jazeera
Syria: 'heavy fighting' in Damascus - Monday 19 March 2012 -- The Guardian

Intense Fighting Rocks Syrian Capital -- Voice of America
Syria: heavy firefight breaks out in Damascus -- The Telegraph
Fighting Flares in Elite Area of Syrian Capital, Activists Say -- New York Times
Syrian forces fight with rebels in rare Damascus clashes -- FOX News/AP
In Syria, clashes reported in affluent Damascus district -- L.A. Times
Syrian troops fight rebels in rare clashes in regime stronghold of Damascus -- Washington Post/AP
Syrian rebels move in on key Damascus neighborhood -- CNN
Rare gunbattle erupts in Damascus, signaling rebel presence -- Washington Post
Upscale neighborhood becomes Syria battleground -- MSNBC
'Heavy fighting' shakes Syrian capital -- Al Jazeera
Syria car bomb kills 2, injures 30 in Aleppo -- L.A. Times
Explosion Hits Aleppo; Syrian Crackdown Continues -- Voice of America
An Iraq-style civil war seems to be taking off in Syria -- Haaretz
Syria accuses Arab states of role in new bomb attacks -- Sydney Morning Herald
Western powers draft new U.N. council statement on Syria -- Reuters

Syria: dramatic increase reported in foreign arms supplies to Assad regime between 2007-2011 -- The Telegraph
Syria arms imports surge, most provided by Russia -- Reuters
Syria stocking up on Russian weapons, report says -- CBC/AP
Report, Visit Push Syria's Russia Connections to Fore -- The Moscow Times
Russian navy's oil tanker makes stop in Syrian port -- FOX News/AP
Black market for weapons nearly depleted, smugglers to Syria say -- Toronto Star/L.A. Times

Russia Seeks Red Cross Cooperation on Syria -- RIA Novosti
Red Cross Chief Urges Syria Aid Access at Talks in Moscow -- Bloomberg Businessweek
Russia 'positive' on Syria daily aid truce: ICRC -- Reuters

Violence in Syria: Whodunnit? -- Economist
Syria's conflict has significance far beyond its borders -- Patrick J. McDonnell, Los Angeles Times
Why Syria Won't Get the Libya Treatment from the West -- Vivienne Walt, Time
It’s right to intervene in Syria, but we shouldn’t do it -- Kelly McParland, National Post
Syrian Regime Resembles Mafia Cartel -- Spiegel Online

Monday, March 19, 2012

Mauritania : esclavitud en el siglo XXI

Foto : Edythe McNamee

Slavery's last stronghold -- CNN

The CNN Freedom Project

Slave master becomes an abolitionist -- CNN

Africa: U.S. counterterrorism strategy at risk

Foto :  The American Spectator

Esta mañana alguien hace el yihad en Toulouse

Foto : AFP

Tres niños y un adulto acaban de morir a tiros en un colegio judío de Toulouse.

La semana pasada fueron acribillados tress paracidistas en Toulouse y en Montauban

Y siguen sin aparecer los explosivos robados en Grenoble...

Sobre los paracaidistas aseinados la semana pasada:

2 French paratroopers shot dead on street -- FOX News

French probe into killing of paratroopers broadened to include counterterrorism investigators -- Washington Post/AP

France boosts security after soldiers killed -- CBC/AP

Three soldiers shot by assailant on scooter in southwest France -- L.A. Times

Three French soldiers shot dead at ATM -- The Telegraph

French authorities link soldiers' fatal shootings -- CNN

France steps up security as troop shootings linked -- AFP

France paratroop killings spur ban on off-base uniforms -- BBC

Investigators baffled by killings of French soldiers -- Independent

Regreso al futuro

Encima de mi mesa de trabajo tengo una edición facsímil de la Constitución de 1812... hecha en 1820.

Ese año --1820-- el puente que nos unía con nuestros hermanos del otro lado del charco estaba carcomido por la broma y el ejército peninsular que partía hacia la que fue nuestra primera guerra civil del XIX se rebeló contra un rey nefando.

Una nueva invasión extranjera, los cien mil hijos de San Luis, partiría las dos Españas, la peninsular y la americana.

España es América y América es España.

La independencia de las naciones americanas no fue otra cosa que una enorme guerra civil.

A lo largo del XIX y del XX las dos Españas --la de allí y la de aquí-- se han consumido en dictaduras y guerras intestinas, domeñadas por las potencias hegemónicas de cada momento.

Pero España sigue.

Todos --los de allí y los de aquí-- llevamos la misma sangre, los mismos apellidos.

Hablamos el mismo idioma, nos emocionamos con los mismos culebrones, rezamos al mismo Dios...

Todos --los de allí y los de aquí-- nos negamos a nosotros mismos a diario.

No somos Españoles. Somos vascos. O somos catalanes. O somos argentinos. Nada que ver con los chilenos. O somos venezolanos. Los colombianos son otra cosa. ¿Honduras y Nicaragua? Por favor. No compare. La duda ofende.

Eso es algo típicamente Español. Es nuestra mayor debilidad.

Visto en perspectiva resulta ridículo.

El divide et impera funciona.

¡Y cómo !

Cualquiera que haya estado en Puerto Rico sabe de lo que hablo.

¿Qué decir del comunismo marxista en Cuba?

España nunca tuvo colonias. No podía tenerlas porque para todos --lleváramos taparrabos o fuéramos el César Carlos-- regía a una misma Ley.

En mi edición facsímil viene una relación, una lista, de los diputados que el diecinueve de marzo de 1812 aprobaron nuestra Constitución, la de todos, la de los de aquí y la de los de allí...

Siguen algunos ejemplos.

El que quiera ver la lista entera la tiene aquí :

ALVAREZ DE TOLEDO, Diputado suplente por Santo Domingo

ANDUEZA, Diputado por el Ayuntamiento de Chachapoyas, Virreinato del Perú.

ARIAS DÁVILA Y MATÉU, Diputado suplente por el Virreinato de Santa Fe.

BEYE CISNEROS, Diputado por la ciudad de Méjico, Virreinato de Nueva España.

CASTILLO, Diputado por Costa Rica.

COUTO IBEA, Diputado por el Virreinato de Nueva España, en Cádiz el día 20 de septiembre de 1810 por los cuarenta y uno electores que formaron lista conjunta con los de Guatemala y Filipinas.

Etc, etc, etc.

Es más --mucho más-- lo que nos divide que lo que nos separa.

España vuelve. Demografía manda.

Y vuelve en América.

La peninsular fue la semilla que, cumplida su función, decae.

Es cada vez menos España y más Europa (o África, según se mire).

El nombre es lo de menos.

Pronto se hablará un mismo idioma desde Alaska a Tierra del Fuego, si Dios quiere.

¡ Hispania vincit !

Karzai: los estadounidenses en Afganistán son "demonios".

Los estadounidenses en Afganistán son "demonios".

Afirman que quemaron Coranes por error pero --en realidad-- se trataba de "actos satánicos que nunca serán perdonados a través de disculpas".

La masacre de 16 niños afganos, mujeres y hombres por un soldado norteamericano "no era el primer incidente, de hecho fue el incidente número 100, el 200 y el 500".

Quien dice esto es el presidente Karzai.

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Hay algo que no nos cuentan / There is more happening out there that they are not telling us ...

El pasado viernes, dieciséis de marzo, el presidente Obama firmó una nueva orden ejecutiva ampliatoria de una orden previa --emitida en plena "guerra fría", en 1950-- dirigida a "preparar los recursos para la defensa nacional" (National Defense Resources Preparedness).

Ni Kennedy ni Bush habían hecho nada parecido ni en la crisis de los misiles de 1962 ni después del 11-S.

Esta orden da al presidente el control total sobre todos los recursos en los Estados Unidos en tiempos de guerra o de emergencia: energía, producción de todo tipo, transporte, comida, e incluso los recursos hídricos.

La orden no limita su aplicación a tiempo de guerra, e incluye el control de los recursos en determinadas situaciones en tiempos de paz.

Resumen de opciones:

(1) La más plausible. Se trate de una simple "actualización" de una norma anticuada.

(2) Voluntad de protagonismo de Obama. Ganas de pasar a la Historia o ganas de querer hacer lo que ningún otro presidente se ha atrevido a hacer.

(3) Un problema "económico" (real) : Endeudamiento con China.

(4) Un problema "militar" (real) : consecuencias de un ataque de Israel a Irán.

(5) Un cataclismo (apuntado por Vulcano en el foro de las FAS).

Friday, March 16, 2012

Video de los tuareg de Malí con el estilo de AQMI (video)

Spain's strategic culture and the impact of NATO (1996)

African AQ-linked groups using advanced IEDs (Marine Corps Times)

Efecto de la detonación de un IED en Afganistán. Foto: US Army

El vínculo que une Irán con Zimbabwe / The link between Iran and Zimbabwe

Foto : AFP

Etiopía ataca Eritrea / Ethiopian troops attacks Eritrea

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